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COMMENTS
NON-RECOGNITION: A RECONSIDERATION
Whenever a government is created, each member of the family of nations
must either grant or withhold recognition. The United States with few excep-
tions has granted recognition to every new government, regardless of its origin
or principles of government, provided only that it have "the control of the
administrative machinery of the state; the general acquiescence of its people;
and the ability and willingness ... to discharge international and conventional
obligations."' In 1932, however, Secretary of State Stimson announced that
the United States would not recognize any government created by conquest.2
'Memorandum of Assistant Secretary of State (Adee), MS. Dep't State file 893.00/
1669; U.S. Foreign Rel. 100-103 (1913); quoted in 1 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law 176 (1940). See also 1 Hyde, International Law 161-65 (1945); Goebel, The Rec-
ognition Policy of the United States 219-21 (1915).
The so-called "de facto" or "stability" doctrine of recognition was initiated by Jeffer-
son in 1793 in recognizing the new French republican government. His announcement
established an objective criterion of recognition requiring only control of the govern-
ment and the acquiescence of the people. The prerequisite of ability and willingness to
discharge international and conventional obligations was first stated by President Hayes
in 1877 with reference to the delayed recognition of the Diaz government of Mexico.
1 Moore, Digest of International Law 148 (1906). The latter requirement was probably
added to the de facto test in order to protect American investments in the countries
concerned, for history shows that interest in this condition is in direct ratio to the
amount of American investments in the country. Neumann, Recognition of Governments
in the Americas, c. I-I (1947).
The exceptions to the general policy before 1932 referred to are non-recognition poli-
ies directed entirely toward Latin-American nations. The Central American Treaties
of 1907 and 1923 (which the United States endorsed, although it was not a signatory)
and the Wilsonian Doctrine announced in 1913 committed the United States to a policy
of non-recognition of those Latin-American governments brought about by revolution-
ary or unconstitutional means. Although Wilson's determination to use recognition as a
means of encouraging constitutional development and democratic habits in Latin-Ameri-
can countries was novel, the requirement of a proper expression of popular consent was
based on a long line of precedent and went back to Jefferson's insistence on "the will
of the nation substantially declared" as a condition of recognition. 3 Jefferson's Works
489 (4th ed., 1939), quoted in 1 Moore, Digest of International Law 120 (1906).
The Hoover administration, however, abandoned the test of "constitutionality" as a
prerequisite to the recognition of governments, except in Central America. Secretary of
State Stimson said on February 6, 1931: "The present administration has refused to
follow the policy of Mr. Wilson and has followed consistently the former practice of
this Government since the days of Jefferson." Quoted in I Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law 186 (1940).
There are several Pan-American treaties and resolutions dating from about 1890, some
of which the United States has signed, which expressly require non-recognition of all
those conquests made in Latin America. See McMahon, Conquest and Modern Inter-
national Law (1940) ; Hyde, Conquest Today, 30 Am. J. -Int. L. 471 (1936).
2That is to say, the United States will recognize neither a new government created
by aggression, such as a puppet government established by the conquering government,
nor the extension of authority by a pre-existing government over territory acquired by
conquest.
The word conquest has perhaps two definitions. It can refer to any seizure of terri-
tory by force or only to those seizures in which force is used illegally, often called ag-
gression. The Stimson note and the Pact of Paris condemned the latter, but they did not
condemn, for example, a conquest made in self-defense. Such a conquest is perhaps
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Since 1932, the United States has formally refused recognition to conquests.3
Yet, it has engaged in conduct with respect to governments created by con-
quest which seems, on the surface at least, to be inconsistent with non-recog-
nition. For example:
"just." In the present discussion the word conquest is used to refer to the illegal use of
force and is synonymous with the word aggression.
The non-recognition announcement was contained in a letter to Japan and China
which referred to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. In September of 1931 the Japa-
nese army invaded Manchuria, successfully occupying the entire region and establishing
a puppet government. The military operations were defended by Japan as necessary
measures of self-defense [see Japan's note of February 23, 1932, to the League Council,
13 L. Nations Off. J. 384 (1932)] but were condemned by the rest of the world as un-
mitigated steps of aggression. The League of Nations was then in session and attempted
to negotiate a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
With the continued aggression of Japan in Manchuria, however, it became apparent
that little hope existed for a solution of the problem by conciliation. Hence, on Janu-
ary 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent his now famous note: "With the recent military
operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Govern-
ment of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th,
1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work
of the Neutral Commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations
will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and
Japan. But, in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations
therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial
Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot ad-
mit the legality of any situation de facto, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may im-
pair treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which
relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity
of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China, commonly
known as the Open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation,
treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants
and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and
Japan, as well as the United States, are parties." Dep't State Press Releases, at 41-42
(Jan. 9, 1932).
Although the Stimson note referred specifically to the Manchurian incident, it was a
statement of the general policy of the United States extending to "any situation, treaty
or agreement" brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris, i.e., "non-pacific"
means.
For details on the Manchurian conquest see the Lytton Report, League of Nations
Document C.663.M.320-1932 VII, and Stimson, The Far-Eastern Crisis (1936). For com-
ments on the Stimson note see Williams, The New Doctrine of Recognition, 18 Trans-
actions of the Grotius Society 109 (1932); Wright, The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932,
26 Am. J. Int. L. 342 (1932) ; Hill, Recent Policies of Non-recognition, International Con-
ciliation, no. 293 (Oct. 1933); McNair, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition, 14
Brit. Y. B. Int. L. 65 (1933) ; Middebush, Non-recognition as a Sanction in International
Law, 27 Proc. Am. Soc. Int. L. 40 (1933); Sharp, Duties of Non-recognition in Practice,
1775-1934, 5 Geneva Special Studies no. 4 (1934); Stimson, The Far-Eastern Crisis
(1936); Briggs, Non-recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine,
34 Proc. Am. Soc. Int. L. 72 (1940); Langer, The Seizure of Territory (1947); Lauter-
pacht, Recognition in International Law (1947); Chen, The International Law of Recog-
nition (1951). For a general discussion of the legal effects of non-recognition in the Far
East see Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict (Wright ed., 1941).
The policy enunciated in the letter of January 7 has come to be known generally as the
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(1) The United States did not recognize the German conquest of Austria
in 1938, yet in 1939 the United States and Germany agreed to extend their
extradition treaty to the territory which had been Austria.4
(2) The United States did not recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia
in 1940 or the puppet government established. In 1950 an unarmed American
navy patrol plane was shot down by Soviet fighters either over the territory
of Latvia or over the Baltic off the coast of Latvia. The Soviet government
sent a note of protest claiming that the plane had flown over Soviet territory
and had fired upon Russian aircraft when instructed to land. The United
States asserted in reply that all planes had been instructed not to fly over
foreign territory, that the plane was unarmed and that the Soviet action con-
stituted a "violation of International Law and of the most elementary rules
of peaceful conduct between nations." 5 But the United States failed to ad-
vance the defense it could have: that it did not recognize Soviet authority in
Latvia.6
(3) The United States did not recognize the Chinese Communist govern-
ment, yet it consented to meet with the Chinese Communists at the Geneva
Convention in 1954. Is it significant that the United States announced that
such action did not imply a recognition of the Chinese Communist govern-
ment?7
Whether American actions in the above instances belie a declaration of non-
recognition is open to question. To answer that question it is necessary to
examine the nature and significance of recognition and non-recognition.
I
International recognition is the acknowledgment or avowal by an inter-
national legal person that certain legal consequences flow from the existence
Stimson Doctrine. President Hoover, however, apparently wanted it to be known as the
Hoover Doctrine and claimed it as his own. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in State-
craft (1954), points out that Hoover was probably in large part responsible for the origi-
nation and application of the doctrine; although one gets a somewhat different impression
from Stimson's book The Far-Eastern Crisis (1936).
The policy is also sometimes called the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine.
' Consult Langer, Seizure of Territory, Part I1 (1947), for a complete survey of diplo-
matic practice from 1934 until 1946.
'Ibid., at 167.
"N.Y. Times § 1, p. 3, col. 2 (April 19, 1950).
'For an account of the Baltic plane incident, see N.Y. Times § 1, p. 1, col. 8 (April 12,
1950). See also ibid., at p. 3, col. 3, 4 (Soviet note of April 11); N.Y. Times § 1, p. 3,
col. 2 (April 19, 1950) (U.S. note of April 19); N.Y. Times § 1, p. 2, col. 2, 3 (April 22,
1950) (Soviet note of April 21); N.Y. Times § 1, p. 3, col. 4 (May 6, 1950) (U.S. note
of May 5).
'Address of Secretary of State Dulles on February 24, 1954. Dep't State-For the Press,
No. 93.
"That is, a government or international organization such as the League of Nations
or the United Nations.
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of some object or from the occurrence of some event. Recognition may be ex-
tended to international transactions such as treaties and annexations of terri-
tory as well as to governments.9 Recognition between governments is said to
be of two kinds: de jure and de facto. Although the terms have been used by
different writers to mean different things, there seems to be a developing
consensus that de facto recognition has the connotation of the qualified and
provisional; that a nation in granting de facto recognition makes it clear from
the beginning that the recognition may subsequently be withdrawn.' 0 De jure
recognition, on the other hand, is absolute, unqualified and, some say, irrevo-
cable." The judicial effects of a de facto and de ure recognition, however, are
identical. 12
Recognition is in essence a matter of intention and may be manifested ex-
pressly-for example, by a public statement or formal note-or implicitly-
for example, by request for a consul's exequatur or the conclusion of a treaty
with the government in question.:1 The act constituting recognition must,
however, give a clear indication of a willingness to accept the government's
authority to represent the state it purports to govern.
14
The purpose of recognition is an issue long disputed among international
jurists. Those authors who maintain the declaratory theory consider recogni-
tion an act which officially acknowledges the existence of a state and which
indicates a readiness on the part of the recognizing state to enter into formal
relations with it. The advocates of the constitutive theory, on the other hand,
believe that recognition is the declaration of the existence of the requisite con-
ditions of statehood, a declaration which creates in the recognized state the
'It is often stated that those objects or events which are recognized are of two types,
standard objects including governments and states and secondary objects including trea-
ties, acquisitions of territory, etc.
"DBriggs, De Facto and De Jure Recognition: Arantzazi Mendi, 33 Am. J. Int. L. 689,
690 (1939) ; Langer, Seizure of Territory 112 (1947) ; Lauterpacht, Recognition in Inter-
national Law, c. 19 (1947); Chen, The International Law of Recognition, c. 18 (1951).
'Despite what some writers say about the supposed irrevocability of recognition, there
are many instances in which de jure recognition has been withdrawn. For example, in a
case tried before the Palestine Supreme Court on December 11, 1940 (Azazh Kebbeda
Tesema v. Italian Government, Ann. Dig. 1938-40, No. 36, 93), the High Commissioner
of Palestine informed the court by letter of November 30, 1940, as follows: "I have been
acquainted by the Secretary of State for Colonies that the de jure recognition by His
Majesty's Government of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia has been withdrawn."
"2Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 345-46 (1947).
Recognition may be implied by the conclusion of a treaty between two nations only
if they simultaneously negotiate and agree upon the terms of the instrument. Recognition
may not be implied if the unrecognized government later accedes to a multilateral treaty
to which the non-recognizing government is a signatory.
"A court should proceed cautiously in implying recognition. Unless the intention to
recognize is clearly implied in certain conduct, the court should consult the State Depart-
ment concerning the status of the government in question since recognition is an execu-
tive, not a judicial, function. See note 56 infra at (a).
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normal rights and duties which international law attaches to states. Lauter-
pacht, an exponent of the constitutive theory, asserts that there is a duty to
recognize those governments which have satisfied the requisites of govern-
mental capacity. It must be admitted, however, that, regardless of any duty, a
state has the power to grant or deny recognition as it chooses. A government
may grant recognition to any government which is able to establish itself in
fact, or it may withhold recognition from certain de facto governments.
The withholding of acknowledgment or avowal by an international legal
person that certain legal consequences flow from the existence of some object
or the occurrence of some event is non-recognition. It is the denial of the legal
status of that from which it is withheld.15 Non-recognition may be applied to
those governments which have not satisfied certain requirements or which
merely do not meet with the approval of the recognizing state. The denial of
recognition, therefore, may be an instrument in international relations to fur-
ther any desired goal.
There were many instances before 1932 in which one nation had withheld
recognition from another.16 Yet there was apparently no attempt to analyze
non-recognition or to determine its proper application. The Stimson note of
January 7, 1932, and the League of Nations' resolution of March 1117 which
adopted a policy of non-recognition of conquests stimulated a great deal of
discussion on the nature and purpose and application of non-recognition. The
'Non-recognition, therefore, is inconsistent with both de jure and de facto recognition.
Lauterpacht, however, maintains that non-recognition applies only to de jure recognition
and that the non-recognizing government implies de facto recognition when it engages in
conduct inconsistent with non-recognition. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law
431-35 (1947).
"61 Moore, International Law Digest, c. III (1906) ; Sharp, Duties of Non-recognition
in Practice, 1775-1934, 5 Geneva Special Studies no. 4 (1934) ; 1 Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law, c. Il (1940).
1 Following the lead of Secretary Stimson, the League of Nations adopted the following
resolution on March 11, 1932: "The assembly [clonsidering that the provisions of the
Covenant are entirely applicable to the present dispute... [r]ecalling the fact that twelve
Members of the Council ... declared 'that no infringement of the territorial integrity and
no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in
disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by
Members of the League of Nations' ... [p]roclaims the binding nature of the principles
and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of
the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be
brought about by means contrary to the covenant of the League of Nations or to the
Pact of Paris." L. Nations Off. J. 87 (Sp. Supp. 101, 1932).
Although the precise legal effect of the resolution has been disputed, the League mem-
bers did express their determination to refuse to grant recognition to conquests. It is not
necessary to pursue the controversy as to whether the resolution of the Assembly, in ad-
dition to being declaratory of existing obligations, was in itself a source of obligation.
For further discussion see Hill, Recent Policies of Non-recognition, International Con-
ciliation no. 293 (Oct. 1933); Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition
in International Law, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 776 (1934) ; 16 Brit. Y. B. it. L. (1935) ; Langer,
Seizure of Territory 96 (1947).
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interest was evoked for at least three reasons. The resolution of the League
was the first instance in which a great many nations agreed to act together in
refusing recognition. s Secondly, the non-recognition policy was directed
against conquest. And, finally, the advocates of non-recognition predicted that
the policy would have substantial results. They claimed that non-recognition
was a powerful sanction which would prevent aggression and restore rights to
injured states without the use of force.19 Its effectiveness as a sanction resulted,
it was said, from the united manifestation of the public opinion, conscience
and moral sentiment of the world.20 "Moral disapproval, when it becomes the
'
8 There have been situations in which a small number of nations have agreed to with-
hold recognition in certain instances. Sharp, Duties of Non-recognition in Practice, 1775-
1934, 5 Geneva Special Studies no. 4, 4-9 (1934). But the resolution was the first instance
in which practically all the nations of the world had agreed on such a course of action.
" On May 4, 1932, Mr. Castle, acting Secretary of State, observed that "in the mecha-
nism of international relations a stern deterrent to the use of force would be to make
valueless the results of war.. .. The spoils of war become Dead Sea fruits.... [Non-
recognition] is a powerful sanction without the use of force ... [and involves] no danger
of war arising out of boycotts." Dep't State Press Releases, at 418-19 (May 7, 1932). On
May 6 he said, "no ... nation in the future will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of its
dishonest attack on the peace structure of society," and "[t]hrough this action the Presi-
dent has 'put teeth in the Pact' and has done it in a way which avoids the use of force."
Ibid., at 446. Secretary Stimson on Feb. 23, 1932, considered that a general adoption of
the policy of the United States "will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights
and titles of which she may have been deprived." Ibid., at 205 (Feb. 27, 1932).
'Secretary Stimson stated on Feb. 23, 1932, that the object of the Pact of Paris and
the Nine Power Treaty was to align "the conscience and public opinion of the world in
favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations, including the settlement
of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force." Dep't
State Press Releases, at 204 (Feb. 27, 1932). Mr. Castle stated, "I have great confidence
in the validity of the decisions which may be reached by the conscience of mankind, and
I think there will be little chance in the future of any serious division in opinion as to
the guilt which must be placed on the nation because it ignores its obligations under the
Kellogg Pact" [ibid., at 446 (May 7, 1932)], and "I believe that the consciences of the
different nations generally run along the same lines... ." Ibid., at 419 (May 7, 1932). He
further stated that "[a]s the President says, it is the strongest moral sanction the world
has ever known." Ibid., at 446 (May 7, 1932). Mr. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of
Far Eastern Affairs, Dep't State, stated on April 29, 1932, that the Pact of Paris "must
rely, for efficacy, upon the sanction of public opinion." Ibid., at 396 (April 30, 1932).
Secretary Stimson stated on August 8, 1932, that the refusal of the United States "to
recognize the fruits of aggression might be of comparatively little moment to an aggressor.
But when the entire group of civilized nations took their stand beside the position of the
American Government, the situation was revealed in its true sense." At the same time he
said that one must assume that behind the Pact of Paris "rests the combined weight of
the opinion of the entire world united by a deliberate covenant which gives to each nation
the right to express its moral judgment," and that the United States on Jan. 7, 1932,
was "appealing to a new common sentiment." Pub. of Dep't State No. 357. President
Hoover stated on August 12, 1932, that acceptance of his doctrine by "all nations of the
world" is "public opinion made tangible and effective." N.Y. Times § 1, p. 4, col. 7
(Aug. 12, 1932). Secretary Stimson stated on October 1, 1932, that the success of the
American policy "can be measured by the unanimous alignment of all the neutral govern-
ments and substantially all the public opinion of the world behind the so-called 'non-
recognition' policy" of the United States. Dep't State Press Releases, at 269 (Oct. 22,
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disapproval of the whole world, takes on a significance hitherto unknown in
international law."'2 1 They claimed, finally, that non-recognition would alter
certain principles of international law.
2 2
The League of Nations' Assembly established an Advisory Committee on
February 24, 1933, to recommend an appropriate pattern of administrative
conduct for the non-recognizing governments. 23 After investigations, the com-
mittee issued a report on June 14, 1933.24 It is significant as the first attempt
to translate non-recognition into concrete terms. The committee advised that
the Manchukuo government should not be allowed to accede to any interna-
tional convention including the Universal Postal Union. It recommended that
non-recognizing governments should not recognize any document issued by the
Manchukuo government purporting to be a passport, nor should they admit
official quotations of Manchukuo currency. But the committee did suggest that
without implication of recognition a citizen of Manchukuo could be granted a
passport by a non-recognizing government; transactions in Manchukuo cur-
rency could be allowed, since domestic currency is utilized in the same way as
any other object of value obtainable in the international market; the na-
tionals of a non-recognizing state could enter into contractual relations with
1932). President Hoover stated on October 7, 1932, that the United States had "definitely
secured that the public opinion of the world will be mobilized and concentrated against
those who violate" the Pact of Paris. Ibid., at 210 (Oct. 8, 1932).
'Address by Secretary Stimson, Aug. 8, 1932. Pub. of Dep't of State No. 357.
' Secretary Stimson, in a letter to Senator Borah, Feb. 23, 1932, said: "If a similar de-
cision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the
world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the
legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty vio-
lation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the
restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived." Dep't
State Press Releases, at 205 (Feb. 27, 1932).
'On January 14, 1932, the League of Nations appointed the Commission of Enquiry
(known as the Lytton Commission) to study and report on the situation in Manchuria
(note 2 supra). The commission reported on October 1 that the Manchukuo government
was a puppet state created by Japanese aggression and recommended that it not be recog-
nized, pursuant to the resolution of March 11 (note 17 supra). League of Nations Docu-
ment C.663.M.320-1932 VII.
On February 24, 1933, the League adopted the Lytton report and appointed the Ad-
visory Committee: "[W]hereas ... the Members of the League 'intend to abstain from
taking any isolated action with regard to the situation in Manchuria and to continue to
concert their action among themselves as well as with the interested States not Members
of the League' and, 'in order to facilitate as far as possible the establishment in the Far
East of a situation in conformity with the recommendations of the present report . . .'
... The Assembly decides to appoint an Advisory Committee to follow the situation ...
to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among
themselves and with the non-member States...." L. Nations Off. J. 24 (Sp. Supp. 112,
1933).
"Report found in L. Nations Off. J. 10-13 (Sp. Supp. 113, 1933). The recommenda-
tions met with the approval of practically all of the states approached. 15 L. Nations
Off. J. 17 (1934).
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anyone in Manchukuo, and even accept concessions or appointments from the
authorities; and that non-recognizing governments could grant applications
for the export of opium to Manchukuo provided the applicant produced an
import certificate containing satisfactory indications that the opium would
not be used for a purpose contrary to the Geneva Opium Convention of
1925. The committee even conceded that governments could maintain and
replace consuls in Manchukuo, although these representatives were to be
instructed not to act in such a way as to imply recognition.
The committee report has been criticized by recent publications as inade-
quate and compromising, 25 yet its approach to the problem is instructive. The
report shows that the committee and the League members thought of non-
recognition as a sanction. When it is believed that the expression of world
disapproval manifested through non-recognition will have a deterrent effect
on the actions of a government, it appears necessary rigidly to adhere to every
traditional ramification of that doctrine. 26 The committee, therefore, out-
lined conduct appropriate to nations invoking non-recognition, forbidding
them to engage in acts considered to imply recognition.
Furthermore, during the period immediately following the Stimson note
and the League resolution, many writers summarized the committee report
with seeming approval of the recommended conduct.2 7 They also seemed to
believe that one of the chief virtues of non-recognition was its force as a sanc-
tion.2 8
II
The United States and the members of the League withheld recognition
from the Manchukuo government for two years. During that time the territory
2 "[Ilt would appear that the Advisory Committee was reluctant to recommend meas-
ures which might have impaired the commercial interests of the nationals of the non-
recognizing States, and that it resorted therefore to expedients and half-way solutions....
Langer, Seizure of Territory 72 (1947).
' In the report of February 24, the nations pledged themselves "not to recognize this
regime [Manchukuo] either de jure or de facto." L. Nations Off. J. 76 (Sp. Supp. 112,
1933). And they appointed the Advisory Committee "to aid the Members of the League
in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with the non-member
states." Ibid., at 24.
'Wright, the Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 Am. J. Int. L. 342 (1932); Hill,
Recent Policies of Non-recognition, International Conciliation no. 293 (Oct. 1933);
Middlebush, Non-recognition as a Sanction in International Law, 27 Proc. Am. Soc.
Int. L. 40 (1933); Sharp, Duties of Non-recognition in Practice, 1779-1934, 5 Geneva
Special Studies no. 4 (1934).
' Hill said: "Most of the policies of non-recognition constitute a kind of sanction for
international law or foreign policy." Hill, Recent Policies of Non-recognition, Interna-
tional Conciliation no. 293, at 9 (Oct. 1933).
This is not to say that everyone was optimistic about the effect of non-recognition
as a sanction. Middlebush and Hill raised some serious doubts about its success.
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was not returned to China, nor did Japanese aggression cease.29 The unity of
the League members began to disintegrate in 1934, and in succeeding years
a number of them granted recognition to the Manchukuo government.30 In the
only instance of unified action by a large number of the world's nations, non-
recognition had proved a failure as a sanction.
It may be argued that the failure of non-recognition to stop the Manchurian
conquest does not prove non-recognition's ineffectiveness as a sanction. In the
first place the conquest began in September of 1931, and the League did not
adopt its resolution of non-recognition until March of the following year.
There was a further delay in waiting for the Advisory Committee report to
spell out the concrete application of non-recognition. There can be no question
that these delays made League action less effective. Finally, the recommenda-
tions when they did appear were compromising.31
The report, however, seems essentially sound in attempting to prohibit only
that conduct which appears inconsistent with non-recognition. Recognition
and non-recognition extend only to governments and not to the people of a
state. A non-recognizing government may not acknowledge that any legal
significance flows from the acts of the non-recognized government, but it and
its nationals are not bound to abstain from dealing with the nationals of the
non-recognized country. It is true that the government and nationals of the
non-recognized state are placed under some restrictions: The non-recognized
government is denied access to the courts of the state withholding recogni-
tion;32 the ordinary immunities of its public property, its diplomatic repre-
sentatives and of the government itself appear to be non-existent.33 But since
" While Japan took no more than Manchuria for the moment, it did not discard its
imperialistic attitude. The militaristic elements in the Japanese government consolidated
their control and waged an undeclared war with the Chinese Republic from 1937 until
1941, when the Japanese attack upon the American installations at Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, caused official declarations of war by the United States, Great Britain
and China. There is no indication that non-recognition of the Manchurian conquest
even delayed the aggression of the Japanese.
'El Salvador first granted recognition to the Manchurian puppet state in March
1934. Subsequently, the following states recognized Manchukuo: Italy in November
1937; Spain in December 1937; Germany in January 1938; Poland in October 1938;
Hungary in January 1939; Rumania in December 1939; and Finland in July 1941. The
other members of the League withheld recognition, including Great Britain in spite of
her divergent attitude in other cases of aggression.
'The report resorted to expedient and half-way solutions. For example, it barred
official quotations of the Manchukuo currency but did not prohibit transactions in it.
'Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 Am. J. Int. L.
261, 265 (1932). For the effect of non-recognition on judicial remedies consult also
Houghton, Recognition in International Law, 62 Am. L. Rev. 228 (1928); Houghton,
The Position of Unrecognized Governments before the Courts of Foreign States, 4 Ind.
L. J. 519 (1929) ; Dickinson, Recognition Cases 1925-1930, 25 Am. J. Int. L. 214 (1931);
Comment, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1951).
'Dickinson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law,
22 Mich. L. Rev. 118, 122, 124 et seq. (1923).
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not all economic relationships are barred, non-recognition falls short of eco-
nomic boycott. Its only purpose is to give expression to the public opinion of
the world, and the committee recommendations were sufficient to do that.
It is in regard to the notion that public opinion through non-recognition
is an effective sanction that the Manchurian episode becomes significant. It
shows clearly that, although non-recognition is not entirely without its effect,34
many factors weaken its force. The officials and nationals of a state may con-
sider foreign criticism unjust, prejudiced, hypocritical or based on misunder-
standing of the facts. Further, a state may be willing to risk moral censure
and even war if the desired object seems sufficiently valuable. Finally, the
condemned state may be governed by experts in molding domestic opinion. 35
Following the Manchurian incident, non-recognition was never asserted
again on a universal scale. The Chaco boundary dispute between Bolivia and
Paraguay in 1932 occasioned a concerted resolution by several Pan-American
nations that they would refuse to recognize any boundary change resulting
from the war.36 The resolution had no effect on the disputants. In subsequent
"That non-recognition had some effect is shown by R. H. Sharp who spent the sum-
mer of 1933 in Manchuria, China and Japan: "The attitude of the authorities of 'Man-
chukuo' with regard to the general policy of non-recognition applied to them has been
one of studied indifference, belied by the keen desire of those officials to have general
world approval for their standing. In a disclaimer given out by the 'Manchukuo Foreign
Office' in Tokyo on May 3, 1933, it was declared that: [']The question of recognition or
non-recognition has practically no bearing upon the work of Manchukuo's constructive
enterprises. Accordingly, this Government has no necessity at present to seek perforce
recognition from other nations nor does it wish to indulge in such childish play as to
boycott or retaliate against those countries which are withholding their recognition.[']
"This policy, often restated, was pursued on the advice of foreign advisers in the em-
ploy of the Manchurian administration and associated with Japanese enterprises. The
fact that it was a sham was disclosed by the jubilation manifested in Manchuria and in
Japan when Salvador extended formal recognition." Sharp, Duties of Non-recognition
in Practice, 1775-1934, 5 Geneva Special Studies no. 4, 14 (1934).
'The Manchurian incident also reminded the world that it is not always easy to
ascertain what constitutes a conquest or who is the aggressor. Conquests may occur
in various and subtle ways: invasions under the guise of self-defense, treaties by co-
ercion and interventions in revolution, for example. Japan claimed that it invaded Man-
churia in defense of its nationals and public property. There were some grounds for
such a claim. See note 2 supra and the references cited therein.
'About the time of the Manchurian incident, the Chaco boundary dispute between
Bolivia and Paraguay was raging. During July of 1932 clashes occurred between the
armed forces of Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco region. The Commission of Neu-
trals, consisting of representatives from the United States, Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba
and Mexico, tried to promote conciliation and suggested the Declaration of American
Republics which was adopted by the nineteen American countries. It stipulated: "The
American nations further declare that they will not recognize any territorial arrange-
ment of this controversy which has not been obtained by peaceful means nor the va-
lidity of territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest
by force of arms." Dep't State Press Releases, at 100-101 (Aug. 6, 1932).
The declaration apparently produced no results, for in the subsequent settlement of
the Chaco conflict non-recognition was never mentioned. Early in 1935 Argentina and
Chile proposed a settlement of the conflict. On June 12 the belligerents agreed to the
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conquests of territory in Europe and Asia the United States has stood alone
in its refusal to grant recognition. The American experience has shown that
non-recognition, when adopted by one nation acting alone, generally has
little or no sanctionary effect.
Although, unlike the Stimson note, it did not involve non-recognition of
aggression, 37 the United States' policy which denied recognition to Latin-
American governments created by revolutionary or unconstitutional means
deserves special attention. For, although the effects of non-recognition and of
the economic and military pressures 38 which so often accompanied it are diffi-
cult to separate, significant political changes resulted in some of the Latin-
American countries whose governments the United States refused to recognize.
In 1903 General Morales seized control of the Dominican Republic. He was
told by the United States that his government would be recognized only if it
would honor all engagements entered into between the American Legation and
the Dominican Republic. The agreements referred to included an arrangement
made in 1900 whereby American control would be exercised over the collec-
tion of Dominican customs to meet payments on Dominican bonds. Morales
agreed and was recognized on January 20, 1904. The presence of a United
States naval vessel in Dominican waters undoubtedly contributed to the
prompt acceptance of our terms, but the threat of non-recognition cannot be
ignored.39
Although constitutionally elected in December 1920, the Obreg6n regime
of Mexico was refused recognition by the United States until it accepted a
proposed treaty which would guarantee restoration and protection of confis-
cated American interests in Mexico. 40 Obreg6n refused, saying his government
was unwilling to pay this price for recognition. Mexico's government was un-
recognized for two and one-half years. Ultimately a joint Mexican-United
States Commission worked out a compromise agreement acceptable to both
governments. Simultaneous statements were released to the press in Washing-
ton and in Mexico City on August 31, 1923, announcing the renewal of diplo-
matic relations between the two governments.
Chaco Peace Conference which met in Buenos Aires that summer. A peace treaty was
signed on July 21, 1938. For details see Woolsey, The Chaco Dispute, 26 Am. J. Int. L.
796 (1932) ; Hill, Recent Policies of Non-recognition, International Conciliation no. 293,
398 (Oct. 1933), and references cited therein; Langer, Seizure of Territory 68 (1947).
' See note 2 supra.
"The combination of non-recognition and military intervention is strikingly illus-
trated by Mexico in 1913, the Dominican Republic from 1913 to 1924 and Honduras
from 1923 to 1925.
' For more details see the diplomatic correspondence in U.S. Foreign Rel. 261-93
(1904).
'U.S. Foreign Rel. I1, 407 (1921).
19541 COMMvENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Again non-recognition was not the only factor involved. Large American
financial interests and the strong military position of the United States, to-
gether with an approach to threats of war, figured substantially in the final
resolution of the dispute.
One month after the United States had withdrawn the Marines from Nic-
aragua in 1925, General Chamorro engineered a coup d'6tat. The United
States denied recognition. Our non-recognition added moral stimulus to a
revolution, materially aided by Mexico, which forced Chamorro to turn the
government over to Diaz. The Diaz regime was promptly recognized. 4'
In 1930 non-recognition apparently forced the resignation of General Ore-
lana who had seized the presidency of Guatemala through revolution. He
assumed office on December "17, but his government was immediately refused
recognition. Orellana resigned and, following the acceptance of former Presi-
dent Chacon's resignation by Congress on January 2, 1931, Reina Andiade
was elected Vice-President and elevated to the post of Provisional President.
The following February General Ubico was elected President, and his regime
was granted recognition by the United States.42 Non-recognition seems to have
been decisive in determining the outcome of the Guatemalan situation.
Aside from the Guatemalan example, it is difficult to conclude that non-
recognition alone had any significant effect in Latin America, although it may
have contributed to the attainment of desired results.43 Recurrent criticism
of the United States' policy, however, indicates that non-recognition was
thought by some to be a successful sanction. At the Inter-American Confer-
ence on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico in 1945, a resolution was
offered to put an end to the arbitrary use of the recognition instrument.44
There have been many criticisms of the Wilson policy as a device of interven-
"' Although the constitutionality of the Diaz regime was questionable, we were forced
to extend recognition to prevent the further intervention of Mexico.
I The communications between Secretary of State Stimson and the, United States
Minister in Guatemala, Whitehouse, are interesting in reference to the effect of non-
recognition in ousting Orellana. U.S. Foreign Rel. III, 172-97 (1930). There was appar-
ently no armed intervention; Stimson even refused to dispatch a warship to San Jose
to prevent any potential disorders. It appears that the situation was uncertain, that
Orellana was in a precarious position, that the impact of American non-recognition to-
gether with the non-recognition of other Latin-American countries might have been a
decisive factor in removing Oreldana. We insisted that he could not be a candidate in the
new elections. He did, however, deny personal ambition.
The population of Guatemala at that time was 2,454,000.
"No study was found of the effectiveness of our non-recognition policy in Latin Ameri-
ca. There are several works which deal indirectly with the topic: Dennis, Revolution,
Recognition and Intervention, 9 Foreign Affairs 204 (1931); MacCorke, American Policy
of Recognition towards Mexico (1933); Neumann, Recognition of Governments in the
Americas (1947).
"Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Washington, 1945), Reso-
lution XXIV, "Abolition of the Recognition of De Facto Governments," quoted in Neu-
mann, Recognition of Governments in the Americas 47 (1947).
[Vol. 22
tion. Such adverse comments seem to assume the effectiveness of the device.45
Secretary Stimson was impressed by the policy, and perhaps was encouraged
by his view of the Latin-American experience to apply non-recognition to the
conquest of Manchuria.4 0
It has been painfully apparent, however, that non-recognition by the
United States of governments outside Latin America has had no sanctionary
effect. The delayed recognition of Russia gained us nothing.47 Non-recogni-
'See the criticisms in Dennis, Revolution, Recognition and Intervention, 9 Foreign
Affairs 204 (1931), and Neumann, Recognition of Governments in the Americas (1947).
For a comment on the Dennis article, see Anderson, Our Policy of Non-recognition in
Central America, 25 Am. J. Int. L. 298 (1931). Stimson praised the policy (n. 46 infra).
The controversy is over whether our non-recognition policy helped stop revolutions in
Latin America or whether it merely intervened in the internal affairs of other nations to
the detriment of all parties concerned.
In his Introduction, Neumann, op. cit. supra, states: "By indirect methods a powerful
foreign government can use its political and economic strength to force a course of action
upon another government as effectively as if it had landed troops upon that government's
soil. One of these methods . . . is the use of the recognition instrument. By refusing to
recognize a new government in an economically weak country, foreign credits can be
checked and foreign trade hindered so that the new regime is financially weakened. The
failure of foreign governments to recognize is also a blow to the regime's prestige, and it
may encourage oppositionist groups in their efforts to unseat the new government ...
[Nlon-recognition . . . therefore constitutes intervention."
"In an address before the Council on Foreign Reations, New York City, on February
6, 1931, Secretary Stimson said: "Since the adoption by Secretary Hughes, in 1923, of the
policy of recognition agreed upon by the five republics in their convention, not one single
revolutionary government has been able to maintain itself in those five republics. Twice,
once in Nicaragua and once in the case of Guatemala, . . . a revolutionary leader has
succeeded in grasping the reins of government for a brief period. But in each case the
failure to obtain recognition has resulted in his prompt resignation, on account of his
inability to borrow money in the international markets. Several times within the same
period a contemplated revolution has been abandoned by its conspirators on the simple
reminder by a minister from this country or one of the other republics that, even if they
were successful, their government would not be recognized; and undoubtedly in many
cases has the knowledge of the existence of the policy prevented even the preparation for
a revolution or coup d'etat. . . . When one compares this record with the bloodstained
history of Central America before the adoption of the treaty of 1923, I think that no
impartial student can avoid the conclusion that the treaty and the policy which it has
established in that locality has been productive of very great good." Quoted in Anderson,
Our Policy of Non-recognition in Central America, 25 Am. J. Int. L. 298, 299 (1931).
The Latin-American experience might explain why Secretary Stimson wanted to couple
the non-recognition of Manchukuo with more forceful measures, such as an economic
boycott. President Hoover, however, was opposed to such a notion, as was Under-Secre-
tary of State Castie, The difference of opinion is brought out in Current, Secretary Stim-
son: A Study in Statecraft, c. 5 (1954).
"I One of the principal reasons for the refusal of the United States to recognize the
Soviet government of Russia after 1917 was the unwillingness of the new government to
fulfill what the United States regarded as its international obligations in the matter of
certain treaties and financial commitments of the Czarist government, of compensation
for expropriation of American property, and of revolutionary propaganda abroad. Ne-
gotiations between the two governments in 1933 resulted in a compromise settlement and
eventual de jure recognition on November 16.
In 1918 and in the following years a considerable number of states refused to recognize
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tion proved similarly unsuccessful as a sanction when applied to the Italian
conquest of Ethiopia and Albania, the German conquest of Austria and
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet conquests. Even if non-recognition was effec-
tive in Latin America, conditions in Europe and Asia were not sufficiently
similar to produce the same results.
III
Its failure as a sanction has brought about a reconsideration of non-recogni-
tion. It is now generally agreed that non-recognition as a manifestation of
public opinion can never be an effective sanction.48 Some writers even consider
non-recognition totally ineffective, if not harmful.4 9 Others, however, have
maintained that non-recognition when applied by many nations can have
the Soviet government for reasons similar to those of the United States. Yet the govern-
ment of Soviet Russia was subsequently recognized by most of those states without being
obliged to give assurances not given reciprocally by the recognizing states. For a detailed
account, see Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1924, 228 et seq. (1926) ; 1 Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law 289-305 (1940).
"
8 Langer, The Seizure of Territory 287 (1947); Lauterpacht, Recognition in Interna-
tional Law, c. 21 (1947); Chen, The International Law of Recognition, c. 32 (1951).
"Mr. Moore, a former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, has
criticized it in the following scathing terms: "Its chief weakness lies in the fact that those
who employ it often must content themselves with futile words or must fight, while the
adoption of the latter alternative would necessarily be a confession of failure. All systems
of law recognize, by the doctrine of prescription and otherwise, that the recognition of
accomplished facts plays, as a principle of certainty and peace, a large part in human
affairs; and nations are but aggregations of human beings, who may not relish daily re-
minders of their shortcomings by others whom they may not deem above reproach, or
wholly disinterested or unprejudiced." Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 395, 436 (1937). For comment on this criticism see Williams, 44 Hague Recueil
281 (1933) and The New Doctrine of Recognition, 18 Transactions of the Grotius Society
109, 120-23 (1933); Wild, Sanctions and Treaty Enforcement 160-79 (1934); Borchard
and Morrison in Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict 157-58 (Wright ed., 1941).
It may also be argued that non-recognition is a nuisance to the non-recognizing power
as well as to the non-recognized government. See Dennis, Revolution, Recognition and
Intervention, 9 Foreign Affairs 204 (1931), and Neumann, Recognition of Governments
in the Americas (1947).
Other critics have suggested that non-recognition of conquests would tend to "freeze"
the status quo. Langer, The Seizure of Territory 118 (1947), suggests, however, that
"non-recognition ... cannot be held to outlast a change of the previous territorial status
effected by means of a general arrangement in the wake of one of the major international
crises which are bound to recur from time to time as long as the international system is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of a number of independent states. ...
Unsatisfactory as this result may be, it is still preferable to a system which accepts uni-
lateral acts of aggression as faits accomplis."
It might finally be argued that non-recognition may contribute to the occurrence of a
war which it was meant to avoid.
The critics of non-recognition seem to believe that a nation should recognize all govern-
ments meeting minimum de facto requirements.
[Vol. 22
beneficial effects.50 Perhaps one of the most significant of these might be, as
Secretary Stimson predicted, a change in international law.51
International law has many sources. It originated with the emergence of
the nation states at the end of the medieval period when the states found that
they needed rules to govern their dealings with one another. The law was com-
piled by writers drawing from religion, private law, natural law and history.
Much of the law of nations is still composed of this rather speculative mate-
rial. There are some rules of international law, however, which are apparently
well established. Writers commonly say, for example, that pacta sunt servanda
is a genuine law of nations.
One of the primary sources of international law is the practice of states. If a
vast majority of the nation states spontaneously follow a certain course of
conduct in a given situation or agree that certain consequences should follow
from a particular act, international law results.52 It is generally agreed that
traditional international law allows the conqueror to obtain title to territory
through conquest.5 3 But a general refusal to acknowledge the legality of a
" "Politically, the non-recognition of a forcible seizure of territory is of considerable
value for upholding the morale of the population of the seized area, for strengthening
their spirit of resistance, not only for their own benefit, but often also for the ultimate
benefit of the non-recognizing State, as many recent instances have shown.
"Juridically, non-recognition acts during the occupation on behalf of the nationals of
the seized State who find themselves within the jurisdiction of the non-recognizing State,
in particular in case war breaks out between the latter and the occupant. After the end
of the occupation, non-recognition affords the returning sovereign a dearer legal position
regarding the rescission of measures of the dispossessing Power. The questions that arose
during and at the end of the Second World War with respect to the personal status and
the assets of nationals of occupied countries clearly show the great importance of the
Stimson Doctrine in the administrative and judicial fields.
"Ethically, non-recognition is the most pertinent manifestation of the postulate that a
unilateral tour de force should not be allowed to bring about a valid change in the exist-
ing territorial order." Langer, Seizure of Territory 288 (1947).
Non-recognition of Manchukuo encouraged China to attempt to reconquer it when
practicable.
See note 22 supra.
'Although there is no authority to enforce the rules of international relations, those
rules are, nevertheless, law. The existence of an enforcing power is not essential to law.
For discussion on the nature of international law see 1 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence
173 (5th ed., Campbell, 1885); Xelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945) and
Law and Peace in International Relations (1942); Morgenthau, Politics among Nations
(1948).
Evans, Leading Cases on International Law 296 (1917) ; Williams, Sovereignty, Seisin
and the League, 7 Brit. Y. B. Int. L. 24, esp. 35, 37, 40, 42 (1926) ; Lauterpacht, Private
Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 105-7 (1927); Eagleton, International
Government 91-93 (1932); Hill, Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations
161 (1945).
McMahon, Conquest and Modem International Law (1940), gives an excellent his-
torical survey of the international law of conquest. While the majority of the authorities
maintain that conquest does and always has given title to territory, there is some dissent.
The Natural Law school has steadfastly adhered to the notions of Aquinas and Augustine
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territorial transfer by aggression would effectively change international law:
A universal affirmation of non-recognition would make the occupation of all
conquered territory illegal.
It is no objection to say that such a change is useless because the law could
not be effectively enforced. A distinction must be made between the desirable
and the undesirable before force can be applied. In the absence of force, law
is, nevertheless, real. It conditions and anticipates.
But non-recognition of conquests is followed by only one nation today.54
that conquest is wrong and cannot create a valid claim to land.
An interesting development arose with regard to the Pact of Paris, the Nine Power
Treaty and Article 10 of the League of Nations' Covenant. The result of the three treaties
made the act of conquest illegal with respect to the signatories. The question remained,
granted the act of aggression-i.e., the use of non-pacific means to gain territory-is
illegal, whether that illegality necessarily voids any title the conqueror might claim to the
territory under the traditional international law of conquest. Lauterpacht seems to take
such a position: "In so far as these instruments [the covenant and the Pact] prohibit war,
they probably render invalid conquest on the part of the State which has resorted to war
contrary to its obligations. An unlawful act cannot normally produce results beneficial
to the law-breaker. . . ." Oppenheim, International Law 453-54 (5th ed., Lauterpacht,
1935) (emphasis supplied).
Lauterpacht argues primarily from private-law analogy. But international law in many
ways is, and must be, different from private law. But even in private law there are in-
stances in which an illegal act ,gives title, e.g., one receives title to the proceeds of illegal
acts such as gambling, peddling dope and establishing a monopoly. It seems difficult to
push the treaties as far as he does. It would seem better to view the treaties as condemn-
ing the means of aggression as illegal but as silent concerning the status of territory once
an illegal conquest has been accomplished. The nations have recognized that they do not
have the privilege to conquer and have imposed upon themselves the duty not to conquer,
but they have said nothing about the results of a wrongful conquest. In the absence of a
specific statement, then, the traditional international law of conquest is still operative.
That is, conquest, though illegal, gives valid title to territory.
Japan suggested a similar view in its reply to Secretary Stimson on January 16, 1932:
"[The Government of Japan] takes note of the statement by the Government of the
United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the
treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by
means contrary to the treaty of 27 August 1928. It might be the subject, of an academic
doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids
the ends secured; but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that ques-
tion does not practically arise." Dep't State Press Releases, at 68 (Jan. 16, 1932). But the
question was "academic" since Japan claimed self-defense. See Japan's note of February
23, 1932, to the League Council, L. Nations Off. J. 384 (1932).
Although the three treaties did not declare the "fruits of aggression" illegal, some writers
have argued that the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris and Article 10 of the League
of Nation's Covenant imposed an implied duty of non-recognition of conquests upon the
signatory nations. If this is true, would not the treaties operate indirectly to change in-
ternational law, since nearly every nation of the world was a signatory of at least one
of the three treaties? Perhaps the universal non-recognition of Manchukuo changed in-
ternational law. If so, the subsequent refusal to withhold recognition from conquests
returned the law to its original position. For further discussion see the authorities cited
in note 2 supra.
" Non-recognition is not implied in the United Nations' Charter. See Langer, The
Seizure of Territory 86-92 (1947).
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The non-recognition of one government by another acting alone is neither a.
sanction nor can it affect the law of nations; nevertheless, it can have value
in the international order. It is a manifestation of the proposition that force
should not be allowed to cause valid territorial rearrangements. It envisages a
world community in which the standard of conduct condemns force and coer-
cion and stealing and which no longer remains passively disconcerted while
nations are subjugated.
The reconsideration of the purpose and value of non-recognition is reflected
in a reconsideration of the conduct appropriate to a nation invoking non-
recognition. When disapproval through non-recognition is thought to have
some impact upon the non-recognized nation, it appears necessary to refrain
from that conduct which would imply recognition. Viewing non-recognition in
a sanctionary context, the League members and the Advisory Committee felt
it essential to impose rigid prescriptions of conduct in order that the dis-
approval of the world might be adequately manifested. But it has been shown
that opinion reflected through non-recognition, whether of one or more nations,
has not in itself proved an effective sanction. The value of non-recognition, if
any exists, is not to alter policies of the non-recognized government, but to
effect some other purpose, such as to change international law. Whether the
non-recognizing government refrains from acts traditionally thought forbidden
by non-recognition is of no consequence to the achievement of such a purpose.
Yet if a government is committed to a policy of non-recognition, there is a
"duty" not to engage in any conduct that would imply recognition of that
which should not be recognized. It has been seen that recognition may be
either express or implied; the essential element is the intention of the recog-
nizing government. In the absence of an express declaration to the contrary,
certain conduct, e.g., the conclusion of a treaty, is sufficient to imply an inten-
tion to recognize. In the presence of an express statement of an intention not
to recognize, however, such conduct cannot imply recognition. The possibility
of implied recognition is abolished by an express declaration of non-recog-
nition.55
' Lauterpacht distinguishes between a contemporaneous statement and a standing policy
of non-recognition. He says: "Any general attitude of non-recognition, i.e., the proclaimed
assumption of the policy or obligation of non-recognition, has a direct bearing on the
operation of the doctrine of implied recognition. It reduces the operation of that doctrine
even below the modes and limits which can otherwise be assigned to it. This means that
particularly exacting evidence of recognition is required in the case of states which have
declared themselves to be pursuing a policy of non-recognition or, even more so, as being
bound by an obligation of non-recognition." But he does admit that "[t]here is room
for the view that in such circumstances nothing short of an explicit and unequivocal act
of recognition will have the result of recognition. Whatever other effects the doctrine of
non-recognition may have, this much may be expected of it, that it has at least the effect
of ruling out implied recognition. In the circumstances, any caveat which might other-
wise be necessary is redundant." Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 395-96
(1947).
19541 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Hence, it violates neither the purpose nor the legal concept of non-recogni-
tion for a non-recognizing government to engage in that conduct which might
ordinarily imply recognition, if an express statement of non-recognition has
been issued.
It follows that the conduct of the United States mentioned at the beginning
of this comment does not show that the United States has ceased to pursue a
policy of non-recognition.56 On the contrary, it has done so consistently. In
determining whether it should continue to do so, the limited potentialities of
non-recognition must be taken into account. The United States may decide to
continue to deny recognition to conquering nations-by declarations of refusal
to recognize-in the hope that as a result aggression may one day be outlawed
by the international community. With the limitations of non-recognition in
mind, it can deny recognition and yet be free to prosecute its foreign policy
unhampered by the inhibitions which a sanctionary view of non-recognition
entails.
'The three instances of questionable conduct mentioned above are not inconsistent with
non-recognition.
(a) The non-recognition policy of the United States toward conquests was well known
in 1939; hence, the extradition treaty with Germany could not have implied recognition
of the conquest of Austria, although the United States did not issue an express statement
of non-recognition until later. Some difficulty could have been avoided had the decla-
ration been made earlier. The case of United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 46 F. Supp. 688
(1942), rehearing denied 47 F. Supp. 520 (1942), rev'd and remanded 137 F. 2d 858
(C.A. 2d, 1943), rehearing 56 F. Supp. 403 (1943), aff'd, rehearing denied 144 F. 2d 286
(C.A. 2d, 1944), illustrates the confusion arising from the court's efforts to ascertain
whether we had implied recognition of Germany's conquest of Austria.
(b) In view of our non-recognition policy our dealings with the Soviet Union could
not imply recognition of their legal control of Latvia. Yet the United States could have
argued in the dispute that it did not recognize that the Soviets had any right to be in
Latvia and, hence, that they had no right to order our plane to land or to shoot at our
plane in an effort to protect Latvia. Our failure to make that defense did not destroy
our non-recognition, but perhaps it indicated the practical significance the State Depart-
ment attached to the non-recognition policy.
(c) The announcement that our meeting with the Chinese Communist government was
not to imply recognition vitiated any possibility of recognition.
PERMISSIBLE EMPLOYEE DISLOYALTY
AND THE DUANE JONES CASE
An employee's loyalty to his firm during the term of his employment is ex-
pected as a matter of course. Often, however, an employee desires to change
positions or to enter business for himself, and while still employed he may
be making detailed plans toward that end.
Caught between the desirability of free competition and the protection of
a vested interest, the law has taken a middle ground. At no time may the
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